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IS TWENTY-TWO MONTHS BEYOND
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD?
ASFA'S GUIDELINES FOR THE TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Katherine A. Hort*
INTRODUCTION
Chris Congdon was two years old when he and his three-year-old
brother were placed in foster care.' The boys' mother, Christine
DiPerna, was mildly retarded and suffered from depression. 2 Their
father was a diabetic-asthmatic with a weak heart.3 He was also a
schizophrenic 4 who had been arrested so often the town police
knew him by name.'
Chris already had been back and forth between parental custody
and foster homes when, at age five, he went to live with Sue Lueb-
bert and her husband Christopher Hill.6 Upon his arrival, the
couple promised Chris he would never have to go to another foster
home. He could stay with them until he returned to his natural
parents.7 Within days he was calling them mom and dad.
8
Chris's foster family encouraged the involvement of his natural
parents. 9 Once, Luebbert and Chris arrived at the Child Welfare
Office to visit with Chris's mother only to find they missed her due
to a scheduling mistake. Luebbert later located DiPerna in a
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2002; B.A., English, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, 1997. I would like to thank Professor Abner Greene for help-
ing me turn a general interest in children and the law into this Note. Special thanks to
the editors and staff of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for their insight and edits,
and of course, to Anne and Robert Hort for everything.
1. Barbara White Stack, Lives on Layaway, A Special Report: Chris, Two
Mothers and a Fork in the Road Home, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, May 10, 1998, at
Al.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Barbara White Stack, Lives on Layaway, A Special Report: Chris Settles In,
Home is a Place that Divides his Heart, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 12, 1998, at
Al.
9. Barbara White Stack, Lives on Layaway, A Special Report. Amid a System in
Chaos, a Promise for Chris, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 11, 1998, at Al.
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nearby coffee shop. 10 For Chris's sixth birthday, Luebbert and Hill
drove him nearly 200 miles to celebrate at his brother's foster
home.1 In addition, they often picked up Chris's parents so they
could attend Chris's open houses at school.' 2
Three years later, Chris and his brother were still in foster care
despite DiPerna and Congdon's efforts to rehabilitate and regain
custody of their children. 13 Around this time, Chris told his Sun-
day school class the Bible story he best remembered was the story
of King Solomon." Finally, in February of 1996, Chris's
caseworker told him the judge was going to cut all legal ties be-
tween him and his parents.' 5
On August 13, 1997, five years after Chris came to live with
Luebbert and Hill, DiPerna and Congdon's parental rights were
terminated. 16 Luebbert and DiPerna, both of whom Chris called
mom, cried. Luebbert said, "There are no winners in this, this is
only about people getting on with their lives.' 1 7 Situations like this
highlight the dilemmas the foster care system must address when
balancing deference to the biological family with a child's need for
a permanent home.
On November 19, 1997, the Adoption and Safe Families Act
("ASFA" or "the Act") was signed into federal law.'8 ASFA
promised to overhaul the failing foster care system 9 by shortening
the time children spent in foster care. Many children languished in
foster care because long term goals were not established, main-
tained, or carried out.20 This is referred to as "foster care drift."'21
10. Stack, supra note 1.
11. Stack, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. Stack, supra note 8.
14. Id. In the famous biblical story of King Solomon, two women claimed to be
the mother of the same child. King Solomon ordered the child be cut in two so that
each mother could keep half. He knew the child's real mother would give up her
claim so the child would not be harmed. 1 Kings 3:16-27.
15. Barbara White Stack, Lives on Layaway, Special Report: Fears and Defiance as
Chris Faces 'Termination' From His Parents: Legal Process to Cut Family Ties Cuts at
the Heart, Too, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 13, 1998, at At.
16. Barbara White Stack, Lives on Layaway, Special Report: Final Plea that Love
is Enough to Send Chris and His Brother Home, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May
15, 1998, at Al.
17. Id.
18. Celeste Pagano, Adoption and Foster Care, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 242, 242
(1999).
19. Id.
20. Del A. v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 1297, 1313 (E.D. La. 1991) (defining drift as
"refer[ring] to children still in the foster care system after many years because perma-
nent goals were not established, maintained and carried out.")
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ASFA contains a provision mandating that the state file for the
termination of parental rights after a child has spent fifteen of the
past twenty-two months in foster care (the "15/22 provision"). 22
There are three exceptions to this provision: (1) if the child is living
with a relative ("kinship placement"); (2) if the state agency has
documented a compelling reason why filing is not in the best inter-
est of the child; and (3) if the state has failed to provide the family
with the services necessary to safely reunite the child with her par-
ents.23 The standard governing the decision to reunify parent and
child is one of "reasonable efforts ' 24 and the Act requires a state's
compliance to be eligible for federal child welfare money.25 Thus,
states have had to pass legislation complementary to ASFA.26 The
legislative responses of states have differed greatly. This Note
21. Id.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(E) (2000).
23. Id.
24. Id. For a discussion of the term, see text accompanying notes 99-108 and 123-
128.
25. Judge Ernestine Steward Gray, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997:
Confronting an American Tragedy, 46 LA. B.J. 477, 480 (1999).
26. Douglas H. Reiniger, The Adoption and Safe Families Act! New York Practical
Implications for Foster Care Agencies and Caseworkers, 182 PLI/CRIM 647, 649 (1999).
27. Compare ALA. CODE § 26-18-5 (2000), and ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088 (Michie
2000), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(7)(b) (West Supp. 2000) and ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-341 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999), with CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 16508.1 (West 2001) and COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(k) (2000), with CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17a-llla (West Supp. 2000), and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103
(1999), with D.C. CODE ANN. § 16.2354 (Supp. 2000), and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806
(West Supp. 2001), with GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-58(m)-(n) (Supp. 2000), and HAW.
REV. STAT. § 587.72(e) (1999), with IDAHO CODE § 16-1623(i) (Michie Supp. 2000)
and 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-13 (4.5)(a) (West 1999), with IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 2000), and IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.111 (West 2000),
with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1581-1585 (2001), and Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(j)
(Michie Supp. 2000), with LA. CH. C ART. 671, and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 4052 (West Supp. 2000), with MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-525.1(b) (1999), and
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000), with MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 712A.19B (West 2000), and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301 (West Supp. 2001),
with MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-13 (Supp. 2000), and Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447 (West
Supp. 2001), with MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-604 (1999), and NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
292 (1998), with NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 128.105 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1998), and
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:4 (1994), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-37 (West Supp.
2000), and N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(l)(i) (McKinney Supp. 2001), with N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B-1111 (1999), and N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-20.1 (Supp. 1999), with OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.41.4 (West 2000), and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7003-4.7
(West Supp. 2001), with OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.502-524 (1998), and 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2512 (West Supp. 2000), with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12.1 (1990), and
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-768 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000), with S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-
8A-26 (Michie 1999), and TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113 (Supp. 2000), with TEXAS
FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2001), and UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 62A-4a-203.5 (2000), with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5531 (Supp. 2000), and VA.
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considers Illinois's and New York's enactments because they are
the states with the starkest decline in the number of children enter-
ing foster care. 28
Illinois has gone beyond ASFA's requirements by incorporating
the fifteen out of twenty-two month exception into a new basis for
parental unfitness.29 An Illinois court may find a parent unfit
based solely on the child's placement in foster care for fifteen out
of the past twenty-two months.3" Although the statute includes the
same three exceptions as the federal act, the new unfitness stan-
dard lightens the state's burden in proving a parent is unfit.31
By contrast, New York has more or less adopted ASFA in full.32
This allows it to rely more heavily on the various exceptions to the
"15/22" requirement.33 Because the exceptions are broad, they can
be applied to many foster care cases. Through reliance on the ex-
ceptions and judicial discretion, New York can easily delay paren-
tal termination beyond the twenty-two month period if deemed
appropriate. Although both states' statutes have the 15/22 rule and
the exceptions, Illinois's inclusion of the new unfitness standard
goes far beyond what the federal ASFA mandates, and this Note
argues, makes it too easy to terminates parental rights. Although
ASFA is designed to limit foster care drift, Illinois's unfitness stan-
dard goes too far.
Part I of this Note discusses the legal precedents, child develop-
ment theories, and policies regarding "reasonable efforts" and pa-
rental termination that led to the enactment of ASFA. Part II
examines Illinois's and New York's different responses to ASFA.
This Part also introduces the debate over "congregate care" as an
alternative for those children who may never be returned to a par-
ent's care, but whom are unlikely to be adopted. Part III argues
CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (Michie Supp. 2000), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.132
(West Supp. 2001), and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-5b (Michie 1999), with Wis. STAT.
§ 48.417 (2001), and Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309 (Michie 1999).
28. Somini Sengupta, Number of Foster Children in City At Lowest Level Since the
1980's, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at Al.
29. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 (D)(m-1)(2000).
30. Cheryl A. DeMichele, The Illinois Adoption Act: Should a Child's Length of
Time in Foster Care Measure Parental Unfitness?, 30 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 727, 755 (1999).
31. Id.
32. Compare N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3) (McKinney 1999), with 42 § U.S.C.
675 (1997).
33. Glenda Morris Rothberg, Foster Care & Adoption Reform Legislation: Imple-
menting the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COM-
MENT. 427, 430 (2000) ("The good news is that there is judicial discretion.").
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the New York system is more workable than the Illinois system
given the complexities of the foster care system.
This Note concludes by arguing the federal government's rigid
time frame for parental termination is overly simplistic because it
makes it difficult for decision makers to account for various indi-
vidual circumstances. A state foster care system is far too compli-
cated to function effectively without the use of the exceptions like
those embraced by New York. Illinois's statute makes it too easy
to terminate parental rights. However, this Note suggests that de-
spite policies dictating faster termination, there always will be chil-
dren who are wards of the state. Foster care may not be the
solution for all of them, and this Note suggests a reconsideration of
group homes as an alternative.
I. HISTORY OF CHILD WELFARE LEADING UP TO ASFA
The proper role of the government in regulating child welfare is
affected by prevailing notions of federalism and family autonomy.
This Part examines historical conceptions of the government's role
in the intimate family sphere. Foster care systems were tradition-
ally administered by the states but changing demands on the foster
care system led to federal involvement starting in the 1970s. Fed-
eral oversight expanded significantly in 1980 with the passage of
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act ("AACWA") 34
and continued with ASFA. It was with these measures that the
"best interest of the child" standard came to govern parental termi-
nation decisions. This part also introduces the highly influential
book, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, that, by emphasizing
the need for stability in the rearing of young children, led to an
emphasis on permanent placements for children.
A. Family Law as a State Issue
Although not necessarily revolutionary on its face, a federal act
addressing child welfare signaled a significant shift in traditional
child welfare policy because family law had historically been
treated as a state issue.35 The framers of the Constitution designed
a government of dual sovereignty in which states would have sig-
nificant control over the "lives, liberties and properties of the peo-
34. This is the acronym for the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980 discussed infra in the text accompanying footnotes 87-108.
35. See generally Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 197 (1999); Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787
(1995).
2001] 1883
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JO URNAL[Vol. XXVIII
pie," whereas the federal government would have power only over
national issues.36 Those powers were to be limited and enumerated
by the Constitution.37 However, through the Commerce Clause,
the Constitution does grant Congress some power over local af-
fairs. 38 Although the potential elasticity of the Commerce Clause
was evident at the founding, the reach of the clause became appar-
ent during the New Deal.39
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause had been inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court as virtually limitless 40
until the recent case of United State v. Lopez,4' in which the Court
invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act.42  This federal act
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace,
negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation
will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several
States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people; and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the state.
Id.
37. Id.
38. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes ... ").
39. The New Deal is the general term used for President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's reforms. In order for much New Deal legislation to be passed, the scope
of congressional power needed to be broadened. See JOHN W. BLUM ET AL., THE
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 706-07 (1993). This was
largely done through a broad reading of the Commerce Clause. Beginning in 1937
with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that a labor
stoppage in Pennsylvania would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce and
thus could be regulated by Congress), the Supreme Court showed a willingness to
uphold commerce-based laws. See generally Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(using the cumulative effect theory to set quotas on all wheat, including that which
would be consumed on the farm where it was grown); U.S. v Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941) (holding that the Tenth Amendment will no longer act as an independent limi-
tation on congressional authority over interstate commerce).
Another significant development in the Supreme Court at this time was the Court's
refusal to continue invoking vague notions of liberty via substantive due process to
strike down progressive state and federal legislation. For a more complete discussion
of this development, see, e.g., Kevin McNamee, Comment, Do as I Say and Not as I
Do: Dickerson, Constitutional Common Law and the Imperial Supreme Court, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 1299 n.382 (2001).
40. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964)
(holding that "the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes
the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the
States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect
upon that commerce"); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that
local activities in the aggregate can affect interstate commerce).
41. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990).
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criminalized handgun possession in proximity to a school. The Lo-
pez Court held that the statute exceeded Congress' authority under
the Commerce Clause. Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote,
"[U]nder the Government's... reasoning, Congress could regulate
any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity
of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and
child custody), for example. Under the theories that the Govern-
ment presents ... it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power. ' 43 Thus, Congress' legislation of family affairs would seem
to "signal the falling of the final outpost of federalism."" Lopez
would seem to assert that legislation pertaining to child welfare be-
longs under state regulation.45
Although family law traditionally has been the domain of the
states, a desperate need for change46 prompted the federal govern-
ment's interference. Furthermore, the financial incentives offered
through ASFA raise issues of conditional spending power. In
South Dakota v. Dole, 47 the Supreme Court held Congress is enti-
tled to influence state policy through the conditional grant of fed-
eral funds. 8 In his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized
the scope of the spending power is limited:
The spending power is of course not unlimited, but is instead
subject to several general restrictions .... [First] the exercise of
the spending power must be in pursuit of the general welfare. In
considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to
serve general public purposes, courts should defer substantially
to the judgment of Congress. Second ... [if] Congress desires to
condition the States' receipt of federal funds, it must do so
43. Id.
44. Adler, supra note 35, at 198. In summary, the majority in Lopez made this
statement:
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile infer-
ence upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the states" and that to hold otherwise "would require us to con-
clude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose
something not enumerated . . . and that there never will be a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
45. Although the legal theories behind the federal/state bifurcation is outside the
purview of this Note, Adler's essay, supra note 35, discusses various analyses includ-
ing feminist and liberal perspectives.
46. These changes are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 87-108.
47. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a federal statute directing the Secretary of
Transportation to withhold a portion of federal highway funds from states that do not
prohibit the purchase of alcohol by those under the age of twenty-one).
48. Id. at 208.
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unambiguously.. . . . Third, our cases have suggested (without
significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might
be illegitimate if they are unrelated to the federal interest in par-
ticular national projects or programs. Finally ... other constitu-
tional provisions may provide an independent bar to the
conditional grant of federal funds.49
Child welfare clearly is intended to "serve general public pur-
poses," and thus the conditional spending offered by ASFA cer-
tainly would be upheld under this test. Further, all fifty states have
enacted legislation in response to ASFA.50 This certainly suggests
that Congress' unambiguously conditions the state's response. The
third prong to the test is the hardest to quantify. There needs to be
a minimal nexus between the purpose for which the spending is
granted and the benefits it will provide.-" Whether federal funding
incentives will, in fact, lead to a rehabilitation of the foster care
system remains to be seen.
Both Lopez and Dole examine the tension between the auton-
omy of the states and the federal government's right to influence
state policy. Although these cases indirectly inform analysis of con-
gressional action in child welfare policy, the Supreme Court has
also directly addressed the termination of parental rights in three
different cases.52 All three cases reiterate the fundamental impor-
tance of the family53 and the privacy protections the family rela-
tionship warrants. 4 Of course, by putting a premium on privacy,
49. Id. at 207-08 (citations omitted).
50. See collected statutes supra note 27.
51. A court would likely find the minimal nexus necessary between wanting states
to facilitate the adoption of more children, and providing financial incentives if they
do.
52. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that Mississippi may not condi-
tion appeals from parental rights termination cases on the affected parent's ability to
pay record preparation fees); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1981) (holding that
"clear and convincing" evidence is constitutionally required in parental termination
proceedings); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent defendants in parental status termination proceed-
ings is not routinely required by the Constitution and should be determined on a case-
by-case basis).
53. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 128 ("To destroy permanently all legal recognition of all
parental relationship[s] . . . [is] among the most severe forms of state action.") (cita-
tion omitted); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 ("[T]his Court[] [has] historical[ly]
recogni[zed] that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27
(holding that "[a] parent's interest ... is a commanding one.")
54. See David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527,
544 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court recognizes a "constitutional right of family
privacy").
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there is an underlying assumption "that, left to their own devices,
family members generally can be trusted to act in one another's
best interests. '55 This is often not the case in parental termination
proceedings and, in these circumstances, the court is required to
pass judgment on the independent interest of the children. In or-
der to justify this intrusion, the Supreme Court, in Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Services of Durham City,56 agreed that the
nature of due process in parental rights termination proceeds turns
on a balance of three factors:57 the private interests affected by the
proceeding; the risk of error created by the state's chosen proce-
dure; and the countervailing governmental interest. 58 This test re-
mains relevant under ASFA and will be discussed in part III when
the approaches of New York and Illinois are analyzed for their
strengths and weaknesses.
B. Psychological Parent Theory
Permanency planning59 in foster care was largely a response to
the psychological parent theory developed by Joseph Goldstein,
Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit.60 In their book, Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child,61 the authors focused on the selection and
manipulation of a child's external environment as a means of "im-
proving and nourishing his internal environment. 62 The authors
set forth the premise that the "law must make the child's needs
paramount. '63 Their view challenged the transient nature of the
child placement system as it existed at the time they were writing.64
55. Id. at 583.
56. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
57. These factors are taken from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
58. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
59. This term is used to describe the emphasis on the importance of a child having
a permanent home. Under permanency planning, a child should either be adopted or
returned to her parents. They should not remain in the purgatory of foster care any
longer than necessary.
60. DeMichele, supra note 30, at 745.
61. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973). Goldstein was affiliated with Yale Law School, Freud with the Hampstead
Child-Therapy Clinic, and Solnit with Yale University's Child Study Center. Much of
the book's persuasion and insight comes from this exceptional mixing of viewpoints
and experiences. Id. at ix.
62. Id. at 7.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 43.
The procedures of child placement are not designed to assure a prompt final
decision. The process is characterized by extended periods of uncertainty
caused by overcautious and overworked administrative agencies; by courts
with overcrowded dockets, extended and oft postponed hearings; and by
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Beyond the Best Interests of the Child emphasizes the import of
having a permanent family to a child's emotional, intellectual, and
moral development.65 Children's needs change constantly as they
develop.66 This necessitates stability with regard to their care.67
Children's sense of time is far more egocentric than adults; they do
not easily tolerate "postponement of gratification;" they are sensi-
tive to being separated from those they care about.68 This becomes
even more marked in foster care situations when a child's loyalties
and affections are often torn.69 These conflicts are exacerbated
since children do not develop a sense of the importance of blood-
tie relationships until they are older. When children are young,
they form their primary attachments based on day-to-day interac-
tions.70 By having continuous contact with one adult who meets
their needs for "physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection, and
stimulation," children learn that they are valued and wanted.71
The authors use the term "psychological parent" to describe the
stable relationship between child and caretaker.72 It is very hard to
build such a bond in foster care because foster care is designed to
be temporary. Foster parents are wary about becoming too at-
tached to their foster child.73 Thus the foster care system can never
offer a child the necessary psychological parent relationship since
judges who are inclined to procrastinate before rendering their decisions at
trial or on appeal.
Id.
65. Id. at 10.
66. Id. at 11.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 12.
Unlike adults, who are generally capable of maintaining positive emotional
ties with a number of different individuals, unrelated or even hostile to each
other, children lack the capacity to do so. They will freely love more than
one adult only if the individuals in question feel positively to one another.
Failing this, children become prey to severe and crippling loyalty conflicts.
Id.
70. Id. at 12-13.
71. Id. at 17.
72. Id. at 19.
Whether any adult becomes the psychological parent of a child is based thus
on day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences. The role
can be fulfilled by a biological parent or by an adoptive parent or by any
other caring adult-but never by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his bio-
logical or legal relationship to the child may be.
ld.
73. Id. at 24. ("So far as the adults are concerned, it implies a warning against any
deep emotional involvement with the child since under the given insecure circum-
stances this would be judged as excessive.").
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children are moved from home to home without enough time to
bond to one caregiver.
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child proposes that placements
should provide the least detrimental foster care alternative availa-
ble to safeguard children's growth and development. The authors
offer two guidelines: (a) placement should safeguard the child's
need for continuity of relationships,"4 and (b) child care placement
"decisions must take into account the law's incapacity to supervise
interpersonal relationships and ... [difficulty in making] long-
range predictions."75
The psychological parent theory, widely accepted by policymak-
ers,76 is not without critics.77 The soundness of Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit's research techniques have been called into question for
reflecting cultural biases,78 being inapplicable to older children,79
and being based on the authors' own agenda.8" The theory also has
been criticized because emphasizing a single psychological parent
74. Id. at 32-35.
[C]hild placement [should] be final and unconditional and.. .pending final
placement a child must not be shifted to accord with each tentative decision.
This means that all child placements, except where specifically designed for
brief temporary care, shall be as permanent as the placement of a new born
with its biological parents.
Id. at 35.
75. Id. at 49.
76. Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 446-
47 (1983) ("Every subsequent proposal to reform the child welfare system has drawn
its vocabulary and central ideas from th[e] framework [set out in Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child].").
77. E.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological
Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 347, 349-50 (1996) (discussing how
certain developments in the human sciences necessitate a new look at the psychologi-
cal parent theory); Garrison, supra note 76, at 425 (concluding that while the child's
need for permanence may justify a termination of custody, it does not justify a termi-
nation of visitation rights); Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the
Context of Parental Rights Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 397, 423 (1996) (arguing that "there are multiple risks that require examina-
tion" when parental rights termination is being considered).
78. Davis, supra note 77, at 359 ("Studies across five cultures have shown that
'after the universal emergence of distress at separation from mother, at about [one]
year of age,... there is considerable diversity among cultures in its decline in the
second and third years of life."').
79. Id. at 353.
80. Johnson, supra note 77, at 406 ("[Tjhe male-dominated mental heath profes-
sions inherently favored Bowlby's [early theorist whose work influence the psycholog-
ical parent concept] theory because it reinforced the notion that it was best for the
mother to stay home and raise her children.").
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does not recognize the importance of the family unit (i.e., siblings,
fathers) as a whole. 81
Specifically, applying the psychological parent theory to foster
children reveals the theory's possible weaknesses. In an influential
article, Marsha Garrison weighs the dangers of possible conflict be-
tween foster parents and natural parents against the potential dis-
advantages of losing a parent altogether.82 She considers various
studies83 and concludes that visitation with natural parents, even if
only sporadic, is beneficial.8 4 Of course, for such visits to work
best, both the natural and foster parents should cooperate. How-
ever, even though antagonism between the natural and foster par-
ents can be troubling to a young child, ceasing contact is not
necessarily better.85 Garrison concludes by suggesting a court
should only consider termination if it has "first deprived the natu-
ral parent of legal custody and appointed a permanent guardian in
his stead. Even then, the court may not terminate other parental
rights unless it finds that the child would suffer specific, significant
harm which cannot be averted by any less drastic alternative. 8 6
81. Id. at 407 ("Although Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit acknowledge that each par-
ent-father and mother-may be a 'psychological parent,' the theory does not appre-
ciate the myriad of caretaking relationships a child may enjoy.").
82. See Garrison, supra note 76, at 460-69.
83. Garrison cites to such studies as Cowen & Stout, A Comparative Study of the
Adjustment Made by Foster Children After Complete and Partial Breaks in Continuity
of Home Environment, 9 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 330 (1939) in Garrison, supra
note 76, at 461 n.170; Van der Waals, Former Foster Children Reflect on Their Child-
hood, 7 CHILDREN 29 (1960) in Garrison, supra note 76, at 461 n.169; E. WEINSTEIN,
THE SELF IMAGE OF THE FOSTER CHILD (1960) in Garrison, supra note 76, at 462
n.177; DAVID FANSHEL & EUGENE SHINN, CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 483 (1978) in
Garrison, supra note 76, at 423 n.4.
84. Garrison, supra note 76, at 466-67 ("Thus, visitation by natural parents can aid
the child in elevating his self-esteem, understanding and coping with his parents'
problems, and effectively mourning the loss of his natural parents. Both psychoana-
lytic theory and empirical data suggest that a visiting parent is better than no parent at
all.").
85. Id. at 467-68.
Gone need not mean forgotten. The child may still cling to an alliance with
the absent parent that prevents him from becoming deeply involved in the
foster home; he may feel abandoned and rejected. Rather than resolving the
child's problems, cessation of contact with the natural parent is likely only to
bury them ... [I]t is better for the child to have to cope with real parents
who are obviously flawed in their parental behavior, who bring a mixture of
love and rejection, than to reckon with fantasy parents who play an under-
mining role on the deeper level of the child's subconscious.
Id. at 474.
86. Id. (citations omitted).
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C. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
Although the government has recognized its inherent parens pa-
triae87 role as "the ultimate protector of children, ' 88 this role his-
torically has fallen within the purview of state law rather than
federal law.89 Throughout the twentieth century, directing the
child welfare system was the responsibility of states, localities, and
private religious and philanthropic organizations. 9° It was not until
the mid 1970s that an increased awareness of the deficiencies of the
foster care system led to congressional action.91 The result was the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
("AACWA"). 92
AACWA attempted to address the "burgeoning problem of 'fos-
ter care drift."' 93 More than 500,000 children were in foster care
and many of them were unlikely to find a permanent home; they
were "drifting" between multiple foster care homes for extended
periods of time.94 AACWA sought to lower the number of chil-
dren in foster care and shorten their stay within the system by (1)
keeping families together whenever possible by providing them
with the support they needed, and (2) finding permanent adoptive
homes for children who could not be reunited with their parents.95
Further, AACWA mandated that: "reasonable efforts will be made
(A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B)
87. Translated from Latin, meaning: "parent of his or her country." BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999). Traditionally, this refers to the role of the state as
sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles. Id.
88. Gray, supra note 25, at 477.
89. While the Fourteenth Amendment favors the family in issues relating to do-
mestic matters, this presumption is balanced against the state's compelling interest in
the well-being of its citizens. Mary O'Flynn, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997: Changing Child Welfare Policy Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 243, 248 (1999). States have historically provided
services for abused and neglected children and have been able to legislate child wel-
fare. Id. It was not until the Social Security Act was passed in 1935 that the founda-
tion was set for federal funding for social services. Furthermore, it was not until 1974,
after the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act was passed, that the federal
government intervened in child welfare policy. Id.
90. Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 642-43 (1999).
91. Gray, supra note 25, at 477.
92. Id. at 477-78.
93. Gordon, supra note 90, at 643.
94. Id.
95. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500, 503 (1980).
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to make it possible for the child to return to his home."9 Less than
a decade after AACWA was passed, the number of children in fos-
ter care exploded.97 Although there were certainly outside factors
such as crack cocaine use, AIDS, homelessness, and teenage
pregnancies98 that contributed to this increase, it was apparent
AACWA was not working.
One of the problems in implementing AACWA was the inter-
pretation of the term "reasonable efforts." Because the term was
not defined in the federal regulation,99 AACWA left to the discre-
tion of state court judges the determination of the reasonableness
of state action. 100 Judges were supposed to receive formal gui-
dance from the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), 1°1 but HHS never created set guidelines so judges were
often left to their own discretion.10 2 Thus, at best, what constituted
reasonable efforts varied according to individual circumstances, 0 3
and the amount of available funding for both parental social ser-
96. Id.
97. David J. Herring, Exploring the Political Roles of the Family: Justifications for
Permanency Planning for Children, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 183, 190 n.50 (1995). "The
number of children in foster care had increased from 280,000 at the end of fiscal year
1986 to 407,000 children at the end of fiscal year 1990." Id. Furthermore, "by the end
of fiscal year 1989, 39.5% of the children living in substitute care had been in care for
more than two years, 15.5% had been in care between two and three years, 13.4% had
been in care between three and five years, and 10.6% had been in care for five years
or more." Id.; e.g., Staff of House Comm. On Ways and Means, 103d Cong., Overview
of Entitlement Programs: 1994 Green Book, H.R. Doc. No. 103-27, at 639 tbl.14-14
(showing an increase from approximately 34,450 foster children in 1970 to more than
100,000 in 1980). One shocking statistic showed that the number of children in the
foster care system was greater than the entire population of the state of Wyoming. R.
Bruce Dold, Giving Kids a Little More "Wiggle Room," CHi. TRIB., Dec. 12, 1997, at
27.
98. O'Flynn, supra note 89, at 245 ("Between 1986 and 1996, an estimated eighty
percent of child abuse and neglect cases involved single mothers with substance abuse
problems."); Cristine H. Kim, Note, Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287, 291-92
(1999).
99. Pagano, supra note 18, at 243.
100. Shawn L. Raymond, Note, Where Are the Reasonable Efforts to Enforce the
Reasonable Efforts Requirement?: Monitoring State Compliance Under the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1237 (1999).
101. Continuing Crisis in Foster Care: Hearing Before the Select Comm. On Chil-
dren, Youth, and Families of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 100th Cong. 3
(1987) (statement of Rep. George Miller) (recognizing that the act's success hinged
on "vigorous enforcement of the legal safeguards and oversight of the program by the
Department of Human and Health Services").
102. See generally Raymond, supra note 100, at 1240 (discussing "how HHS's un-
willingness to aggressively enforce the judicial determination requirement has allowed
states to circumvent congressional intent under AACWA").
103. Id. at 1245.
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vices (in the case of reunification) and appropriate foster care
placement (in the case of adoption). At worst, a finding of reason-
able efforts was a mere formality. One study showed that child
welfare agents devoted as little as thirty seconds to deciding
whether reasonable efforts were shown. 10 4 Many states went so far
as to preprint court orders that included check boxes so judges
would not forget to include the words "reasonable efforts" in their
orders.'0 5
Thus, as the reasonable efforts requirement grew increasingly in-
effective, the National Commission on Children concluded in 1991
that: "[i]f the nation had deliberately designed a system that would
... abandon the children who depend on it, it could not have done
a better job than the present child welfare system.' 0 6 It was the
failure of AACWA that led to such high expectations for the
Adoption and Safe Families Act, which was lauded as a "revolu-
tion"'1 7 that would be "to the abused and neglected children in our
nation's foster-care system what the Voting Rights Act was to
black Americans in 1965. "1°8
D. The Adoption and Safe Families Act
The Adoption and Safe Familes Act ("ASFA" or "the Act") was,
at least partially, an outgrowth of the Clinton Administration's fo-
cus on issues affecting families and children. 10 9 The Act originally
was introduced in the House Ways and Means Committee by Rep-
104. Children in State Care: Ensuring Their Protection and Support: Hearing Before
the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth and Families of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 99th Cong. 20 (1986), at 21 (statement of Mark Soler).
105. Raymond, supra note 100, at 1254.
106. NAT'L COMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN
AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 293 (1991).
107. Dold, supra note 97.
108. Jeff Katz, Finally the Law Puts These Kids' Interests First, MILWAUKEE J. SEN-
TINEL, Dec. 28, 1997, at 1.
109. E.g., Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B
(1994) (prohibiting state court modification of another state's child support orders);
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1997, 29 U.S.C. §§.2601, 2611-2619, 2631-2636,
2651-2654 (1997) (granting family and temporary medical leave under certain circum-
stances); Multiethnic Placements Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994) (allowing children to
be placed with parents of other races); HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VIL-
LAGE: AND OTHER LESSONS CHILDREN TEACH Us 7 (1996).
Children are not rugged individualists. They depend on the adults they know
and on thousands more who make decisions every day that affect their well-
being. All of us, whether we acknowledge it or not, are responsible for de-
ciding whether our children are raised in a nation that doesn't just espouse
family values but values families and children.
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resentatives Dave Camp (R-Mich.), Barbara B. Kennelly (D-
Conn.), and E. Clay Shaw (R-Fla.), and was called the Adoption
Promotion Act of 1997.110 Lead sponsors in the Senate included
conservative Republican Mike DeWine, moderate Republican
John Chafee, and liberal Democrat Jay Rockefeller.' It had tre-
mendous bipartisan support-organizations as diverse as the Heri-
tage Foundation" 12 and the Children's Defense Fund" 3 endorsed
it;'I 4 the House approved the bill 416 to five;'1 5 and the Senate did
not even call the roll." 16
Limiting the time period between when a child enters the state
foster care system and the initiation of termination proceedings in-
volves a delicate balance between promoting family preservation
and reunification and ensuring the safety and health of children." 7
As originally introduced, ASFA required states to begin termina-
tion proceedings for any child under ten who had been in foster
care for eighteen of the past twenty-four months."' After some
debate, the time frame was shortened to twelve of the past eigh-
teen months. 9 Congress eventually split the difference by decid-
ing that fifteen months was an appropriate time period. 121
The purpose of ASFA is "[t]o promote the adoption of children
in foster care.'12' Thus, ASFA pushes states to implement legisla-
110. H.R. 867, 105th Cong. (1997).
111. 143 CONG. REC. S12,526 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Chaffe).
112. For information on The Heritage Foundation, see http:///www.heritage.org/
mission.html ("The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institute-a
think tank-whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public
policies.").
113. For information on the Children's Defense Fund, see http://
www.childrensdefense.org/aboutus.htm ("CDF provides a strong, effective voice for
all the children of America who cannot vote, lobby, or speak for themselves. We pay
particular attention to the needs of poor and minority children and those with
disabilities.").
114. 143 CONG. REc. H2022 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kennelly).
115. Id. at H10,782 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Shaw).
116. Id. at S12,198 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997).
117. 143 CONG. REC. H2014 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (Representative Kennelly
referred to this balance as "a central dilemma in the field of child protection.").
118. Id. at 2016 (statement of Rep. Shaw).
119. Id. at 2027 (statement of Rep. Tiahrt).
120. Of course, as with many compromises, "[s]omething was lost in the effort to
please all parties." Shalini Ahuja et al., My Law's "Flawed," Says Richard Gelles,
CHILD WELFARE WATCH, Winter 2000, No. 6, at 5. Richard Gelles, the "father" of
ASFA, is concerned that the timelines are not customized for children depending on
their ages. Id. Gelles feels that: "[T]he termination timetable should be much shorter
for infants and toddlers-six months, in most cases. But he also says there shouldn't
be any timetable at all for children in their teens." Id.
121. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
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tion favoring expedited parental rights and adoption proceedings.
Although ASFA continues the federal family preservation and sup-
port systems initially enacted with AACWA, 22 there is a definite
shift in focus from AACWA's emphasis on the preservation and
reunification of families. One of the most pronounced changes to
AACWA is ASFA's effort to define the reasonable efforts require-
ment. 123 Although not offering an explicit definition, ASFA does
provide that "in determining reasonable efforts to be made with
respect to a child, as described in this paragraph, and in making
such reasonable efforts, the child's health and safety shall be the
paramount concern. ' 1 24 Thus, the Act does not articulate a defini-
tion, but does seek to clarify the requirement.
Further, states are not required to make reasonable efforts if a
court has determined that a parent of a child in foster care has
committed specific violent crimes against any of their children.
125
Reasonable efforts are also not necessary if the parent has sub-
jected a child to "aggravating circumstances" such as "abandon-
ment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse" as defined by state
law.126 In order to speed up the judicial process, once a court de-
termines that reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families
are not required, the state must hold a permanency hearing within
thirty days and make a "reasonable effort" to find the child a per-
manent placement. 127 Additionally, "reasonable efforts shall be
made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the
permanency plan, and to complete whatever steps are necessary to
finalize the permanent placement of the child.' 28 ASFA also em-
phasizes concurrent planning, meaning the state must be making
122. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2000).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2000).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2000).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii) (2000)
Such crimes include:
(I) Committed murder.., of another child of the parent
(II) Committed voluntary manslaughter ... of another child of the parent
(III) aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a
murder or such a voluntary manslaughter
(IV) committed a felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the
child or another child of the parent.
Id.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2000) ("[T]he parent has subjected the child to
aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may include but
need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse.)").
127. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)(i)-(ii) (2000).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)(ii) (2000).
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alternative arrangements for a child while still trying to rehabilitate
the natural parents.129
ASFA seeks "to strike a balance between family reunification
and preservation with the health and safety of children. '130 ASFA
addresses three major concerns: 131 (1) the impracticality of family
reunification; 132 (2) "foster care drift";133 and (3) the need to in-
crease adoptions of foster children unable to return to their
parents.1
34
The Act also seeks to promote adoption. 35 States can no longer
allow inter-jurisdictional barriers to delay adoptions 36 and must
129. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(F) ("[R]easonable efforts to place a child for adoption
or with a legal guardian may be made concurrently with reasonable efforts of the type
[made to preserve and reunify families.]"). Douglas H. Reiniger defines concurrent
planning as: "From initial placement, social workers must simultaneously work both
toward discharge to parent and adoptive planning. Efforts to recruit pre-adoptive
homes and place foster children in pre-adoptive homes must be commenced as soon
as a child is placed in foster care." Douglas H. Reineger, The Adoption and Safe
Families Act! New York Practical Implications for Foster Care Agencies and
Caseworkers, 182 PLI/CRIM 647, 650 (1999). This is distinguished from the earlier
practice of contingency planning: "a linear approach to planning that emphasized the
primacy of parental rights." Id. at 649.
130. Gray, supra note 25, at 478.
131. Gordon, supra note 90, at 650-51. Gordon presents these three major con-
cerns and the series of measures enacted to address them. Id.
132. Id. at 646-47.
Experts, activists, and journalists told horror stories of state agencies that
had sent children home to parents who had savagely beaten, prostituted, or
tried to kill them or their siblings .... Some commentators treated these
cases as indicia of the larger failure of family preservation programs to
achieve measurable results. The more common view was that family preser-
vation could still be useful in some circumstances, but not when parents had
crossed a line that made them dangerous to their children.
Id.
133. See Del A. v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 1297, 1313 (E.D. La. 1991) (defining and
discussing "foster care drift").
134. See Gordon, supra note 90, at 649. Gordon writes,
[Slo adoption now enjoyed fervent bipartisan support. With the President's
help, Republicans had already pushed through Congress an adoption tax
credit and a tightening of the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act, banning delays in
the adoption process that result from race-based matching of parents and
children. President Clinton had also announced a national goal of doubling
the number of children adopted from foster care to 54,000 by the year 2002.
Yet both sides agreed they could do more. Although new data showed an
increase in the number of public sector adoptions, such adoptions had not
kept pace with the dramatic growth in the foster care population over the
last decade. Congress hoped to reduce foster care drift largely by increasing
adoptions.
Id. at 649-50.
135. See Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(12) (2000).
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document their efforts to search for adoptive parents through
adoption exchanges.137 ASFA also creates financial incentives to
increase adoption of foster children.'38
II. NEW YORK AND ILLINOIS: DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO
ASFA's TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS PROVISION
In keeping with the federal statute, both New York and Illinois
have adopted the "15/22" termination provision as well as the three
exceptions. However, these states seem to have divergent goals.
Whereas New York puts a premium on the reunification of the nat-
ural family, Illinois emphasizes the importance of adoption. This
Part presents a chronological view of both New York and Illinois's
foster care policies. It then considers their different approaches to
responding to ASFA. This Part also introduces congregate care as
a possible solution for children who are not adoptable, but are not
able to be returned to their parents' care.
A. New York's Approach to ASFA
1. History of New York Statute
New York began requiring permanency planning as part of their
child welfare policies as early as the 1970s. 1 9 The present statute,
which implements ASFA's "15/22" termination requirement,14 °
was enacted on February 11, 1999. 41 The statute was applied ret-
roactively to all children currently in foster care. 142  "Pending
agency adoptions and private-placement, pre-adoption certification
proceedings are also covered."'1 43
The new provisions do not abolish old family court practices, but
rather add "a layer of responsibility" to them.'" Family court
workers hope that many current laws and practices can be used to
137. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(E) (2000).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d)(1) (2000) (providing for incentive payments payable to
the state of $4,000 per child for the increase in the number of foster children adopted
per year over the average number prior to the passage of the Act, and an additional
$6,000 per "special needs" adoption). See also 42 U.S.C § 671(a)(21) (2000) (defining
"special needs" as requiring "medical, mental health, or rehabilitative care").
139. DeMichele, supra note 30, at 738 n.99.
140. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 358-a (McKinney 1999).
141. Rothberg, supra note 33, at 427-28.
142. Janet R. Fink, Implementing the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act in
New York, A Primer on the New Statute, 183 PLI/CRIM 157, 159 (1999).
143. Id.
144. Rothberg, supra note 33, at 428.
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satisfy the federal requirements,145 thus avoiding confusing changes
for courts and participating agencies.' 46 There is tremendous pres-
sure on New York (and on all the states) because federal funding is
conditioned on enactment of provisions set out by the federal
statute.
147
2. Provisions of New York's Statute
New York's ASFA legislation shifts New York's focus away from
"the paramount rights of the biological parent" and toward "the
well-being and best interests of the child.' 48 The legislative intent
behind the adoption of stringent time constraints was to pressure
parents to rehabilitate faster so that their children could be re-
turned to their custody. 149 The impetus is made stronger by the
fact that a parent's effort also affects the custody of her other chil-
dren.150 As discussed earlier, under ASFA, child welfare agencies
are mandated to engage in concurrent planning. 151 However, the
New York statute does not provide any guidelines or standards for
concurrent planning. The law, as written, still dictates that the
state's first obligation is to help the family reunite through appro-
priate services.' 52 The Family Court Advisory Committee has pro-
posed legislation that would obligate "local departments of social
145. Id.
146. Id. ("Right now the courts and people who work in the courts are trying to
figure out what the statute says, how they can implement the statute.").
147. 42 U.S.C. § 679b(4) (2000) (providing for necessary regulations so that state
performance may be measured as a condition to receiving federal funds).
148. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 358-a (McKinney 1999) (Supplemental Practice
Commentaries).
149. Rothberg, supra note 33, at 428.
It [the statute] pressures parents whose children enter the social services sys-
tem to work diligently to get their children back, because they are at a
greater risk now that their children will be placed in another setting, which
will become a permanent setting for the child through a variety of mecha-
nisms that are enumerated in the statute.
Id.
150. FAMILY COURT ADVISORY AND RULES COMM., N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT
Sys., REPORT OF THE FAMILY COURT ADVISORY AND RULES COMMITTEE TO THE
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NY 14 (1999)
[hereinafter JUDICIAL MEMORANDUM] ("Moreover, termination of the parental rights
of one child may constitute grounds for an authorized agency to seek judicial authori-
zation to cease reunification efforts with respect to siblings." This means that if a
parent loses rights to one of their children, all efforts to reunite them with others will
cease.).
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(F) (2000).
152. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(1)(iii) (McKinney 2001). This law is very differ-
ent in scope from the federal ASFA which is meant to "promote the adoption of
children." Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
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services, and, as applicable, authorized child care agencies, to
gather information necessary for the formulation and effectuation
of permanent plans promptly when a child enters care, and on an
ongoing basis thereafter."'1 53
The new statute mandates "permanency hearings" reflecting the
substantial judicial involvement necessary to monitor the move-
ment of children out of foster care.154 During these annual hear-
ings, the court is able to review the permanency plan for a foster
child and decide if the plan is being implemented properly. 155 The
decisions that must be made include whether the child will be re-
turned to the parent; recommended for parental termination;
placed for adoption; or referred for legal guardianship or some
other planned permanent living arrangement. 156 If there is a find-
ing that reasonable efforts were made to reunite the family, the
hearings will finalize the permanent placement arrangement.
157
Permanency hearings must occur within the first twelve months af-
ter the child entered care,158 regardless of whether the placement
was voluntary or involuntary.1 59 The court has the option to sus-
pend the requirement if reasonable efforts were made to reunite
the family.' 60 If the court decides reasonable efforts are not re-
quired, then the hearing must be held within thirty days.'61 Al-
though these changes are meant to increase judicial involvement
and responsibility, they have been interpreted by some as limiting
the services and assistance that parents receive. 62
Reasonable efforts is only one of ASFA's three exceptions. Ad-
ditionally, if there is a "compelling reason" for determining that
termination would not be in the best interest of the child, the state
153. JUDICIAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 150, at 6.
154. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 358-a(3)(b), 392(5-a) (McKinney 2001).
155. Rothberg, supra note 33, at 429.
156. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 358-a (McKinney 2001).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. Within the context of concurrent planning, there are benefits to providing
parents with an opportunity to voluntarily consider options for their children. See
Madelyn Freundlich, Expediting Termination of Parental Rights: Solving a Problem or
Sowing the Seeds of a New Predicament?, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 97, 107 (1999) (address-
ing policy reasons for allowing voluntary placement).
160. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 358-a (McKinney 2001).
161. Id.
162. See Bernardine Dohrn, Foster Care & Adoption Reform Legislation: Imple-
menting the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COM-
MENT. 419, 425 (2000) (referring to the no reasonable efforts exception as "creating
confusion" and "offer[ing] the state an ever-expanding list of cases where no reasona-
ble efforts are required.").
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is not required to terminate within twenty-two months. Compel-
ling reasons include: (a) the child has a permanency goal other than
adoption; (b) there are insufficient grounds for filing a termination
petition; and (c) the child is more than fourteen years old and will
not consent to adoption.1 63
Because the courts are becoming more actively involved in the
foster care system, the role of legal representation for children is
becoming increasingly important. In a recent article, 64 Marvin
Ventrell considers the various models of legal representation for
children, and finds that two traditional models exist. The first is
the "pure attorney" model, in which the attorney represents the
child as they would any other client.165 The second is, the "attor-
ney guardian ad litem" model, in which the attorney represents
what they consider to be the child's best interest.1 66 New York,
according to Ventrell, has created a new model, which he refers to
as the "child's attorney" model. 167 This model recognizes:
[T]hat children are not simply little adults, and that we cannot
simply act as attorneys in the traditional sense with no excep-
tions .... The model recognizes that you can give a child too
much autonomy in the legal process and that children do not
always know what is best for them.168
This issue of legal representation of children becomes relevant
under ASFA because if there is a finding that reasonable efforts
are not necessary, lawyers will need to advocate much more ag-
gressively because they will have less time to prepare and more to
overcome.' 69 Thus, "the right to competent counsel is 'indispensa-
ble' for both parents and children both to protect the fundamental
family interests at stake and to assist the court in making well-in-
formed, reasoned decisions. 170
Recently, Child Welfare Watch proposed a solution which in-
cludes the following provisions: (a) helping parents regain custody
163. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 358-a (McKinney 2001). These additional exceptions
are not enumerated in the federal ASFA. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2000).
164. Marvin Ventrell, Foster Care & Adoption Reform Legislation: Implementing
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 433,
433 (2000).
165. Id. at 436.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 437.
168. Id. at 437-38.
169. Id.
170. JUDICIAL MEMORANDUM, supra, note 150, at 14.
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of their children should be the main priority of the system;' 71 (b)
the city's Administration for Children's Services must force agen-
cies to provide more quality services to parents before termination
proceedings begin;172 (c) agencies that have placed a high percent-
age of their children on the adoption track should be scrutinized
closely;173 and (d) the exceptions to ASFA must be utilized "as vig-
orously as possible." '174 These solutions were proposed after exten-
sive interviews with people who work in New York City's child
welfare system, and are indicative of how ASFA is being
interpreted. 175
New York's emphasis in implementing ASFA remains on judicial
discretion 76 and the three exceptions.1 77 For example, at least one
court has spoken out against ASFA's "one size fits all approach"'178
because the court was concerned that the termination criteria
would replace individualized determinations on a case. The New
York system emphasizes individual consideration of each case,
rather than speeding up hearings for the sake of efficiency.
B. Illinois's Approach to ASFA
1. History of Illinois Statute
Unlike New York's policies, which had elements of permanency
planning as early as the 1970s,179 Illinois child welfare policies had
none until ASFA. The first Illinois law relating to the adoption of
children was passed in 1867.180 It remained "relatively unaltered"
until 1874, when revisions addressing the legal effect on the child's
171. Shaluni Ahujaetal, Recommendations & Solutions, CHILD WELFARE WATCH,
Winter 2000, No. 6, at 3. ("The city and its agencies need to recognize they are failing
to do this fundamental job-and that many families will be wrongly split apart as a
result of that failure.").
172. Id. ("ASFA's great flaw is that it speeds up the clock on terminations without
creating an equal mandate to pressure agencies to make energetic efforts on behalf of
reuniting families.").
173. Id. ("One of the most crucial indicators of an agency's commitment to re-
uniting parents with their kids is the percentage of children it places on the adoption
track.").
174. Id. (citing the most important exception as being reunification).
175. Id.
176. Rothberg, supra note 33, at 430 ("The good news is that there is judicial
discretion.").
177. But see John Courtney et al., CHILD WELFARE WATCH, KEEPINC AN EYE ON
CHILDREN, Summer 1995, no. 5 at 2 (1999) ("The [New York] system emphasizes
bottom-line efficiency over examining agencies' work in depth.").
178. In re Adoption of Jonee, 695 N.Y.S.2d 920, 925 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999).
179. DeMichele, supra note 30, 738 n.99.
180. Id. at 730.
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natural parents of the adoption were added. 8' In 1907, the Adop-
tion Act was amended so that parental unfitness was a requisite
finding for entering an adoption decree. 82 There were no "signifi-
cant changes" to the Adoption Act until 1945 when revisions re-
garding prospective adoptive parents were added. 183 The Act was
altered again in 1959 to add an additional parental unfitness
ground184 rendering a parent unfit if she had "neglected or mis-
treated her child." '185 In 1967, the Illinois General Assembly re-
vised the Adoption Act of 1959 so that it no "longer required a
court to adhere to previous findings, decrees, orders, and judg-
ments from other proceedings affecting or determining parental
rights. ' 186 This provision worked to slow down termination pro-
ceedings because the court could, effectively, start from scratch
with each new hearing.
2. Provisions of Illinois Statute
In response to ASFA, the Illinois General Assembly enacted
Senate Bill 1339 in June of 1998.187 The bill was drafted primarily
by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services
("DCFS"). 88 DCFS incorporated parts of the bill into Section 2/13
of the Juvenile Court Act, 8 9 which creates strict time limits to initi-
ate parental rights termination proceedings. 190 ASFA provisions
are generally reflected in section 2 / 1 3 ,19t however, unlike AFSA,
which initiates termination proceedings based on the time the child
is in foster care, section 2/13 defines parental unfitness based on the
child's length of stay in foster care.1 92 These changes were enacted
both "in compliance with and in response to" 193 ASFA. 194 Section
181. Id. at 730-31.
182. Id. at 731-32. The grounds included: "(1) depravity; (2) open and notorious
adultery or fornication; (3) habitual drunkenness for the space of one year prior to the
filing of the petition; (4) extreme and repeated cruelty to the child; (5) abandonment
of the child; or (6) desertion of the child for more than six (6) months preceding the
filing of the adoption petition." Id.
183. Id. at 732.
184. Id. at 734.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 734-35.
187. Id. at 747-48.
188. For more information about DCFS, see http://state.il.us/dcfs/ababout.shtml.
189. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-13 (4.5)(a) (2000).
190. Id.
191. Compare 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/2-13(4.5)(a) (2000), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(5)(E) (2000).
192. DeMichele, supra note 30, at 749.
193. Id. at 750.
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2/13 includes ASFA's fifteen of twenty-two months time limit.195
After filing a termination petition, the State Attorney must prove
the parent is unfit under one of the state's parental unfitness
grounds.196
Section 2/13 includes the same three exceptions as both the New
York provision and the federal act. 197 It also mandates concurrent
planning "so that permanency may occur at the earliest opportu-
nity. It states that consideration should be given so that if reunifi-
cation fails or is delayed, the placement made is the best available
placement to provide permanency for the child. ' 198 Like ASFA,
Illinois defines reasonable efforts as making "the child's health and
safety.., the paramount concern." 199 In addition, however, it uses
the time line as a new ground for proving parental unfitness. The
court can find parents unfit if their child has been in foster care for
fifteen out of the past twenty-two months.20 0 Although this eases
the state's burden of proving a parent is unfit,20 parents can rebut
this presumption of unfitness 202 by showing that it is in the child's
best interest to be returned to that parent within six months from
the date of the proceeding.20 3 Similarly, the time frame may be
tolled if the court finds that no reasonable efforts were made by
the state to reunite children with their birth parents.20 4
Even with these exceptions, this new provision does not require
the state to consider whether the parent is capable of, or interested
in, parenting.205 Thus, because Illinois's ASFA provisions go be-
yond what is required by ASFA, it is likely that Illinois will find
more parents unfit than will other states.
Since the passage of ASFA, Illinois has led the states in the num-
ber of placements of children in permanent homes20 6 and has sig-
194. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/2-13(4.5)(a) (2000).
195. See Id. § 405/2-13(4.5)(a)(1) (2000).
196. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/1(D) (2000).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
198. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 505/5 (a)(3)(F) (2000).
199. See id. § 505/5 (1-1) (2000).
200. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/1(D)(m-1) (1993).
201. DeMichele, supra note 30, at 755.
202. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/1(D)(m-1) (2000). The statute requires a parent to
make this showing by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. DeMichele, supra note 30, at 755.
206. In 2000, Illinois was awarded $5.3 million dollars from the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services. This was a million dollars more than Cali-
fornia (which ranked second) received. Press Release, Illinois Department of Child &
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nificantly reduced the number of children in foster care.2"7
However, much of this is a result of adoption. Although the Illi-
nois Department of Children and Family Services emphasizes that
foster care is only a temporary solution and that the "ultimate
goal '2 0 8 is to reunite the child with his birth parents, much more
emphasis is placed on adoption.20 9 Many states' programs empha-
size family preservation programs; an Illinois study found such pro-
grams ineffective.21 ° Critics of the study argued that the failure of
family preservation programs in Illinois was caused by a poorly run
programs, not a fundamental flaw in the system. It appears that
Illinois puts a lower priority on reunification than New York.
C. History of Congregate Care
New York and Illinois have legislated very different policies in
reaction to ASFA's timeline for termination of parental rights.
This Part discusses the history of group homes in America. Con-
gregate care facilities, historically called orphanages, were tradi-
tionally the most common care option for children not living with
their parents.
In colonial America, most children who were wards of the state
were either indentured or apprenticed.21' Some orphans worked in
exchange for acquiring skills, food, and clothing until they reached
the age of majority.21 2 Others lived in almshouses where they usu-
ally were mixed "with the ill, the insane, the elderly, and the crimi-
Family Services, Governor Ryan Announces Illinois Receives $5.3 Million Bonus for
Increasing Adoptions (Nov. 20, 2000), at http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/nrmpv2000.htm.
207. Press Release, Illinois Department of Children & Family Services, Governor's
Budget for Children and Family Services Supports Continued Permanency for Chil-
dren (Feb. 2, 2000), available at http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/nrbrud2001.htm. ("At the
end of fiscal year 1.997 there were 50,727 children in substitute care. By the end of
fiscal year 2001 there will be just 27,330 children in out-of-home care, a 46 percent
reduction.").
208. Press Release, DCFS Among 'Adoption 2002' Excellence Awards Recipients
for Second Consecutive Year (Nov. 30, 1999), available at http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/
nradawd.htm.
209. Id. For example, the website has headings for both adoption and foster care,
but not for reunification services. See id.
210. NAT'L COALITION FOR CHILD PROTECTION REFORM, DOES FAMILY PRESER-
VATION WORK? at http://www.nccpr.org/newissues/lO.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2001)
(arguing that "Illinois took every rule for how to run a successful family preservation
program and broke it").
211. TIMOTHY A. HACSI, SECOND HOME: ORPHAN ASYLUMS AND POOR FAMILIES
IN AMERICA 11 (1997).
212. Id. at 16. They would also most likely receive some religious training, and by
the 1800s many states had laws requiring that a basic education be provided. Id.
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nal. ''2 13 While some of these children were orphans, many of them
had parents who were too poor to care for them. By the 1830s,
orphan asylums were widely thought of as the best option for sub-
stitute family care. 1 4 Factors that influenced the growth of "or-
phan asylums" were largely the same as those contributing to
urban growth. 15 Industrialization and the accompanying labor
wages left many families "unable to deal with any calamity they
might face. '216 Canals and railroads, which made travel easier, fa-
cilitated both the spread of diseases (leading to an increase in mor-
tality) and an increase in mobility (leading to an increase in
desertions). 17 Since people were less likely to live near relatives,
family support was unavailable if an emergency were to arise; when
parents needed help, instead of relying on family members, they
began to leave their children at orphanages.21 8
Before 1860, most orphanages were administered by Christian
organizations. 219 However, in the period after the Civil War, the
states began to create large, publicly funded "Soldiers' Orphans'
Homes. 22 0 By the Progressive Era,221 complaints mounted that
asylums were too large and too institutional to be effective for fos-
tering child development.222
In 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt called the White House
Conference On Dependent Children. 223  The Conference was
called "at the urging of several prominent reformers, none of
whom was an advocate of orphan asylums. '224 The most influential
conclusion of the Conference was that:
[C]hildren should not be removed from their parents simply be-
cause a family was poor. When it was necessary to remove chil-
dren, they should be placed in carefully selected foster homes,
which were deemed superior to institutions. Orphan asylums
were a distant third choice; institutions, when used, should be
for temporary care of children only, and if possible in small cot-
213. Id.
214. Id. at 4.
215. Id. at 20-21.
216. Id. at 21.
217. Id. at 21-22.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 25.
220. Id. at 27.
221. The years between 1900 and 1920 are called the Progressive Era because it was
a time of widespread societal reform. E.g., BLUM, supra note 39, at 553-609.
222. HAcsI, supra note 211, at 37.
223. Id. at 37-38.
224. Id. at 38.
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tages rather than crowded congregate asylums. Annual state in-
spections should be made of every kind of agency that cared for
dependent children. In effect, orphan asylum managers were
told that they were the last resort.22 5
Despite criticism, orphanages continued to be founded.226 These
group homes were defended on the grounds that although good
private homes might be optimal they were difficult to find.227 "Or-
phan asylums were needed to temporarily care for children while
their families weathered harsh economic times, or while the asylum
or another agency was trying to place them in homes. '228 Foster
care was becoming more common, but it did not replace institu-
tional care in the 1910s and 1920s.229 The passage of Aid to De-
pendent Children as part of the Social Security Act of 1935230
contributed to the demise of the orphanage, for it enabled poor
children to remain in their mother's care.231 Before the passage of
"Mother's Pensions," children were removed from parents who
could not support them. These pensions enabled single mothers to
not work outside the home and instead stay home and care for
their children.
Today, most group homes care for children with special needs.232
Group homes for other children largely fell out of favor because no
matter how they were run they remained institutional.233 By neces-
sity, group homes were highly structured and organized, leaving
little room for orphans to develop individuality or to receive spe-
cial attention.2 34 The policy of group homes once again gained the
attention of policy makers when in 1994 Newt Gingrich, Speaker of
the House of Representatives, suggested that the money saved by
cutting welfare benefits to unwed teen mothers could be used by
225. Id.
226. Id. at 40.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 50.
230. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE His-
TORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 4 (1994).
231. See MATTHEW A. CRENSON, BUILDING THE INVISIBLE ORPHANAGE: A PRE-
HISTORY OF AMERICA'S WELFARE SYSTEM 1 (1998) (discussing how anti-institutional
sentiment contributed to the development of mother's pensions).
232. With the development of welfare programs, many children were maintained in
their parent's homes with public subsidies. Many orphan asylums responded by shift-
ing away from caring for ordinary children and instead focusing on children with spe-
cial needs. See HACSI, supra note 211, at 46.
233. See id. at 148.
234. Id. at 148-49.
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the states to fund orphanages. 235 Although the idea was dismissed
by some as being "Dickensian" and "unbelievable and absurd, 236
it has been supported by others because orphanages offer greater
continuity and stability than foster care since there is less moving
around.237
III. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD CANNOT ALWAYS BE
DETERMINED IN TWENTY-TWO MONTHS
The "15/22" provision was enacted to help eliminate foster care
drift, but a strict time frame raises concerns. First, it is possible
that, given more time, a greater number of parents could rehabili-
tate themselves. Second, termination is largely irrelevant if the
child is not ultimately adopted. New York and Illinois have diver-
gent preferences regarding the best solution to these difficult is-
sues. The New York statute 238 may err on the side of keeping a
child in foster care too long before termination of parental rights,
whereas the Illinois statute 239 leaves open the possibility that pa-
rental rights will be terminated too quickly. However, termination
cannot automatically solve an abused or neglected child's
problems. It is only one piece of the solution. The more difficult
issue is what should happen to children who are "liberated" from
their parents, but are still not adopted.
This Part first discusses why New York's ASFA legislation pro-
vides a better solution to the foster care problem than does Illi-
nois's. It then argues that termination is often just the beginning of
the problem, and that states that equate termination with success
are oversimplifying the issue. Although termination is helpful to
children who will be adopted, there is also a need for alternative,
permanent arrangements for the many foster care children for
whom adoption is not a likely outcome. One such possibility is
congregate care, or what was historically known as the orphanage
system.
235. Sharon Cohen, Des Plaines' Maryville: A Model for Orphanages, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 28, 1994, at 8.
236. Mitchell B. Pearlstein, Orphanage Idea Gets Better Reception, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), May 24, 2000, at 21A.
237. See id.
238. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3)(McKinney 1999).
239. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 (D)(m-1)(2000).
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A. New York Provides a Better Solution Than Illinois
The New York statute gives the courts more discretion to con-
sider the individual circumstances of each family. If courts have
the discretion, resources, and time to consider not only the tradi-
tional factors such as violence or abuse, as well as the likelihood of
a child being adopted and the present involvement of the natural
parent, terminations may occur less often or over a longer period
of time. However, it is not the number of terminations by which a
state's "success" should be judged. These are decisions that should
be carefully researched and considered. The best interest of the
child must remain the primary concern. Although the phrase "best
interest of the child" has become linked to the permanency move-
ment, there are situations in which the "best interest of the child" is
not benefited by termination.
The effect of the Illinois statute's "15/22" provision is that more
parental rights terminations will occur. Yet, this does not necessa-
rily mean that all children affected will be adopted. It is possible
that more terminations will result in more "legal orphans. "240 On
any given day in the United States, one-fifth of the children in fos-
ter care are legally available for adoption.241 Research shows that
children in foster care often maintain deep attachments to their
biological families, and thus termination should be recommended
only if the child is likely to be adopted. 42 Just because a child does
not live with their parents does not mean the child has forgotten
them. If a child has little chance of a permanent placement with a
new family, their parents rights to see them or talk to them should
not be limited. Children with special needs, because they are less
likely to be adopted, and older children, who are more likely to
remember their biological families, will not necessarily benefit
from parental termination. Whereas younger children, who do not
remember their natural parents and will likely be adopted, should
remain in foster care for as short a period as possible. The physical
condition and age of a child should be considered before a termina-
tion takes place.
240. Legal orphans are defined as "children legally severed from their natural par-
ents without an awaiting adoptive home." DeMichele, supra note 30, at 755 (citing
Talk of the Nation: Adoptions for Abused and Neglected Children in Foster Care (Na-
tional Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 18, 1997).
241. Id. at 755-56 (stating that "on any given day in the United States, at least
107,000 of the 507,000 children currently in foster care are legally free and awaiting
adoption").
242. Garrison, supra note 76, at 462.
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New York's law puts a great deal of weight on the subjective
opinions of the judges, social workers, and agency staff who over-
see the state foster care system. This individualized consideration
is time-consuming and costly. By contrast, Illinois's statute set in
place procedures that are more efficient and put less pressure on
the already overwhelmed foster care system. ASFA was intended
to hasten a child's passage through foster care, and it is possible
that by relying on discretionary exceptions, New York's already
overburdened courts will be unlikely to meet the requirements of
ASFA. Some might conclude that individualized consideration is
flawed, allowing the exceptions to swallow the provision, and thus
enabling foster care drift. This conclusion, although seemingly log-
ical, is not satisfactory since the decision to terminate a parent's
right to her child must not be taken lightly. New York's law recog-
nizes that individual circumstances, such as the likelihood of adop-
tion and the individual child's needs and wishes, should be taken
into consideration.
Termination only lowers the number of children in foster care if
those children free to be adopted are indeed adopted. Many chil-
dren in foster care are not appropriate candidates for adoption be-
cause of age, sibling groups, or emotional and physical difficulties.
The Illinois provision makes it easier to terminate parental rights,
but does not offer any new solutions for permanent placements.
Stories like Chris Congdon's243 illustrate that if termination eventu-
ally does occur, it is no less painful for having been slow. Chil-
dren's rights must be the primary concern, coming before the
efforts of parents to both rehabilitate themselves and exert their
parental rights. Children should have the opportunity to build
family ties with an appropriate adoptive family, and for this to oc-
cur, the rights of the child's natural parents may have to be termi-
nated. Nevertheless, it is troubling that under Illinois law, a parent
may lose the right to raise her own children because they have
lived in foster care for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months.
The Supreme Court's test for when parental rights should be ter-
minated highlights the possible shortcomings of Illinois's parental
termination provision.244 The court balances three factors so as ad-
dress the competing issues of parental rights and the well-being of
the child. Justice Blackmun characterized the difficulty of deter-
mining whether a parental termination is appropriate in his dissent-
ing opinion in Lassiter:
243. Supra text accompanying notes 1-17.
244. Supra text accompanying notes 52-58.
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At stake here is the "interest of a parent in the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children." This in-
terest occupies a unique place in our legal culture, given the cen-
trality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and
responsibility ..... [F]ar more precious . . . than property
rights," parental rights have been deemed to be among those
"essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 1245
Because a termination proceeding is "both total and irrevoca-
ble,"246 courts must consider the risk of an erroneous termination.
The Supreme Court addresses this balance in Santosky: "For the
child, the likely consequence of an erroneous failure to terminate is
preservation of an uneasy status quo. For the natural parents, how-
ever, the consequence of an erroneous termination is the unneces-
sary destruction of their natural family. ' 247 In Santosky, the court
struck down a New York statute that set the standard for parental
termination at only a "fair preponderance of the evidence" because
"[t]he individual should not be asked to share equally with society
the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is signifi-
cantly greater than any possible harm to the state.
248
Parental termination creates two dangers: the risk that a parent's
rights might be terminated when they should not be, and the
chance that a parent's rights should have been terminated, but
were not. The first is great because parental termination is perma-
nent. "Unlike other custody proceedings, it leaves the parent with
no right to visit or communicate with the child, to participate in, or
even to know about, any important decision affecting the child's
religious, educational, emotional, or physical development. '249
Truly, this is a "unique kind of deprivation. '25 0 The Court has rec-
ognized the gravity of such a decision in all three of the relevant
cases. To give any possible benefit of the doubt to the parent, the
Court allocates the risk appropriately through the standard of
245. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
246. Id. at 39.
247. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 765-66 (1981).
248. Id. at 768 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)).
249. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39.
250. Id. at 40.
1910
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
proof,251 allowing for appeals in forma pauperis,252 and appointing
counsel in certain situations. 3
In contrast, the danger of not terminating parental rights fast
enough is less serious. There is usually no risk of additional danger
to children because they must be removed from their parent's cus-
tody before a termination proceeding. In fact, one of the main ar-
guments against extended foster stays is the expense. As Chris
Congdon's foster care experience illustrates, extended foster stays
involve caseworkers, child welfare office visits, and court appoint-
ments, all of which cost federal, state or local government, as well
as the families involved, money.2 54 Nonetheless, the significant ec-
onomic costs must be considered along with the emotional costs to
the families. It is also unrealistic to think that there will be no costs
once children are returned to their parents or adopted. Many
adopted children are still subsidized by the state. 55 Even children
who are returned to their parents will likely continue to receive
state subsidies because most families in the foster system live be-
low the poverty line.256
The cost of proper placement is clearly money well spent. Chil-
dren's best interests are still paramount, and it remains in their best
interests to have permanent homes. Often, the actual court termi-
nation proceedings do not drastically change children's day-to-day
arrangements. In Chris's case, the adoption was largely symbolic;
he already had lived with Hill and Luebbert for five years. His
situation also was distinct because his own parents had remained in
close contact with him. This is often not the case. In one study,
fifty-seven percent of the children still in foster care at the end of a
five-year study were no longer receiving visits from their natural
251. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48.
252. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 106 (1996). In forma pauperis is defined as "the
manner of an indigent who is permitted to disregard filing fees and court costs."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 783 (7th ed. 1999).
253. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 19.
254. While the cost of state subsidies for children in foster care is quite substantial,
these are not relevant since many children will continue to be subsidized even if
adopted. CHILD WELFARE WATCH, Too FAST FOR FAMILIES, WASHINGTON'S GET-
TOUGH ADOPTION LAW HITS HOME 5 (2000) (finding that in New York City, 99.6%
of adoptive parents received the adoption subsidy in 1998); see also 42 U.S.C. § 670
(2000) (providing adoption assistance for children with special needs).
255. See 42 U.S.C. § 670 (2000).
256. See Stephanie Jill Gendell, In Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First
Three Years of the Adoption and Safe Families Act Implementation, 39 FAM. & CON-
CILIATION CTs. REV. 25, 26 (2001) (citing poverty as one of the main reasons for
foster care placements).
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parents.257 In a situation in which the child was not in close contact
with his natural parents, the tension between loyalties would likely
be lessened.
Thus, although New York's statute may err on the side of not
terminating rights quickly enough, this is not as problematic as Illi-
nois's statute which likely errs on the side of terminating parental
rights too quickly.
B. The Focus on Time Limits is Overly Simplistic
ASFA's time limit creates various problems. For example,
ASFA's exception regarding parents who have been denied the
services required by the reasonable efforts clause creates a loop-
hole. Most families do not get perfect services because family
courts are both under-funded and under-staffed.2 58 The volume of
new cases brought under ASFA exacerbates the problem. 259 Fur-
thermore, the legal representation of children within an adversarial
system is difficult since the parent, the child, and the state may- all
have divergent views . 6 0 Thus, the largely situational concept of
reasonable efforts is difficult to qualify. Another problem with the
time limit is that ASFA only mandates the initiation of termination
proceedings.26' Once started, they may take months to com-
plete.262 Factors such as the time taken by the individual
257. Garrison, supra note 76, at 423 n.4 (citing David Fanshel's and Eugene Shinn's
study).
258. Bill Grimm, Adoption and Safe Families Act Brings Big Changes in Child Wel-fare, YOUTH LAW NEWS, Nov./Dec. 1997, at 7 ("[The reasonable efforts] exception is,
in the real world, likely to limit severely the impact of the requirement that the child
welfare agency seek parental rights termination. Unavailability of services and failure
to provide timely and appropriate services to parents are common to child welfare
systems nationwide."); See also Melissa D. Protzek, A Voice For The Children, PENN.
LAWYER, January/ February 2000, at 26 ("Juvenile court judges in urban areas have
about 15 minutes per case to decide the fate of abused and neglected children.").
259. Grimm, supra note 258 at 8. While some funds have been authorized to assist
the courts, these funds are not yet appropriated. Id.
260. See Ventrell, supra note 164, at 434-35.
[Als we place ASFA in the adversarial system, we have to be prepared to
make it work. One of the things we know about that system is that under-
represented interests, those not accompanied by zealous, competent and in-
dependent advocacy, will not be heard. In other words, children without
representation will not get the ASFA intended outcomes.
Id.
261. 42 U.S.C. § 675 (5)(E) (2000) ("[T]he state shall file a petition to terminate the
parental rights of the child's parents.").
262. Congressional Budget Office, H.R. Rep. No. 77, at 23 (1997) (noting that the
termination of parental rights process "takes anywhere from 90 days to several years,
with the median length of time being about a year").
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caseworkers to gather and organize the information necessary to
pursue the case will affect how long the termination proceedings
take.263
By equating termination with success, ASFA seems to assume
that any child who is free to be adopted will be adopted. It also
assumes that if a child is returned to his natural parent's care, the
child will be appropriately cared for. Neither of these assumptions
is necessarily true. By recognizing that Chris Congdon's situation
was unusual, one sees the shortcomings of a rigid termination
schedule.
Chris was fortunate to have a loving, responsible set of
caregivers who were waiting to adopt him. This is often not the
case. 264 For the many children who are unlikely to be adopted (ad-
olescents and teenagers, sibling groups, emotionally or physically
disabled children) enforced time limits are ineffectual. Their par-
ents' "termination" will not effectively change their situation.
They will remain in state care because they are less likely to be
adopted than young, healthy children. It is an interesting side note
that Chris Congdon's twelve year old brother (who is mentally re-
tarded, suffers from depression, and has attempted to kill himself
four times) 265 lived in a group home.266 Even though he is unlikely
ever to be adopted, his parents' rights to him were terminated
along with their rights to Chris. They can no longer visit him, or
call him for his birthday, or send Christmas presents. This is unjust.
For a child who will otherwise have no parents, an imperfect pair
often may be preferable. This is especially true when the children
are older and already have significant ties to their birth parents..
Termination deadlines presume that a child is better off without
their natural parents. This is likely true when there is a history of
abuse or with a situation like Chris's in which he had formed strong
emotional ties to another family. However, for the many children
in care whose primary attachment is to their birth parent(s) a ter-
mination is not beneficial.
Another problem with considering reunification as the end of
the solution is that just because a child is reunited with his birth
parent does not mean the state's role is over. "Between thirteen
263. Freundlich, supra note 159, at 102.
264. Ellen H. Silberman & Maggie Mulvihill, House Bill Would Speed Up Adoption
Process, BOSTON HER., Dec. 1, 1998, (stating that 4,000 children are placed in foster
care, but only 1,000 are adopted each year).
265. Stack, supra note 1.
266. Stack, supra note 9.
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and forty-five percent of children who are reunited with their bio-
logical parents after being in foster care become victims of abuse
again. ' 267 Because termination is permanent, it is possible that
when faced with the serious decision to either terminate or return a
child to his parents, a judge might lean towards returning the child.
This could result in a child being returned to parents who were not
yet in a position to care for him.
Time limits raise significant issues for parents who must be sepa-
rated from their children for reasons unrelated to their parenting
capabilities. Drug addicted parents and incarcerated parents are
both affected by ASFA's strict guidelines. A drug addicted par-
ent 268 may be unable to comply with the requirements imposed by
ASFA. 269 A parent may be unable to recover from an addiction in
twenty-two months.2 70  Drug dependency often involves re-
lapses, 27 1 and the waitlist for treatment centers may exceed twenty-
two months. 72 Some children will become available for adoption
even though their own parents, with treatment, would have been
able to regain custody of their children. 73
A similar situation arises with parents who are incarcerated. In
the past thirty years, the "War on Drugs '274 has greatly increased
the number of women who are incarcerated. In 1998 there were
more than 80,000 female prisoners, and of those, the vast majority
267. Thomas J. Walsh, The Clock is Ticking: Do the Time Limits in Wisconsin's
Termination of Parental Rights Cases Serve the Best Interest of Children?, 83 MARQ. L.
REV. 743, 758-59 (2000).
268. U.S GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PARENTAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE, GAO/HEHS
98-40, 4 (1997). This United States Department of Health and Human Services report
found that, depending on the area of the country examined, substance abuse was in-
volved in up to 90% of all child abuse or neglect cases. Id.
269. O'Flynn, supra note 89, at 257 (stating that "permanency decisions may be
required before a parent is even admitted to a treatment program, and long before it
can be determined whether a parent is likely to succeed in substance abuse
treatment").
270. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 268 (noting that "drug treat-
ment may last up to one or two years").
271. Conference, Is Our Drug Policy Effective? Are there Alternatives? 28 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1,164 (2000) (decrying the public health message that "drug abuse is a
chronic and relapsing brain disease").
272. O'Flynn, supra note 89, at 260 (contending that "services currently available
are inadequate").
273. See generally O'Flynn, supra note 89 (suggesting coordination between sub-
stance abuse treatments and child welfare agencies as a possible solution).
274. In a message to Congress in 1971, President Richard Nixon "portrayed drug
abuse as 'a national emergency,' labeling it 'public enemy number one' and calling for
'a total offensive."' STEVEN WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE ON THE WAR ON
DRUGS 3 (1986). Since then, the term has largely become associated with a drug pol-
icy that emphasizes criminalization as opposed to treatment.
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had minor children. 75 Some of these children are in kinship care,
but those who are placed in non-kinship foster homes are affected
by ASFA's termination provisions. A mother, incarcerated for a
crime that had nothing to do with her children, can lose them if her
sentence is more than twenty-two months.
Foster care is often the only option for parents who must be sep-
arated from their children. However, little scholarship exists on
what motivates adults to take in foster children. Although there
certainly are people who want to be good foster parents for the
sake of being foster parents, many are hoping to become adoptive
parents. This can create a conflict if the child is either unwilling to
be adopted or unavailable because his own parents' rights have not
been terminated. Thus, there is a need for options that do not lead
to a child's conflict of loyalty to two sets of parents.
Foster parents share their homes and their time with needy chil-
dren. They may receive subsidies to pay for the child's expenses,
however, they no longer expect tangible compensation. "The most
natural compensation is for the placed child to form an attachment
to the foster carers; the foster carers may view this as incompatible
with the child having strong family attachments. '276 If a child has
ties to his natural parents while in foster care, "a triangulated con-
flict among parents, children, and foster parents" may exist.277 Al-
though initially Luebbert and Hill struggled to create "the perfect
alliance between birth family and foster family" for the benefit of
Chris, eventually they realized that the problem was too complex,
and that they had to instead worry about what was best for the
child. 78 The conflict involved is inevitable when a child's loyalty is
pulled in different directions.
Although proponents of foster care have said that "[i]deally
there should be a moratorium on expectations for children to at-
tach themselves to foster carers, ' 2 79 this is unrealistic. It is also
unfair to expect a child not to bond with their foster parents, espe-
275. See Myrna S. Raeder, Creating Correctional Alternatives for Nonviolent Wo-
men Offenders and Their Children, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 377, 381 (2000).
276. SALLY E. PALMER, MAINTAINING FAMILY TIES: INCLUSIVE PRACTICE IN Fos-
TER CARE 82 (1995). Palmer refers to such fostering as "exclusive." This sort of fos-
tering tends to engender "tension and competitiveness" between natural parents and
foster parents. Id. at 83 (citations omitted).
277. Id. at 87 (citation omitted).
278. Barbara White Stack, Lives on Layaway, A Special Report: Chris' Parents get a
Place of Their Own and Demand Their Boys Back, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, May
14, 1998 at Al.
279. PALMER, supra note 276, at 91.
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cially when they see them more regularly than their own parents.
This is a problem to which congregate care might be a solution.
C. Congregate Care May be a Possible Solution
One such option is a return to what were known historically as
orphanages. This term, which brings to mind Oliver Twist280 and
Little Orphan Annie,281 are now more euphemistically termed
"group homes" or "residential academies. "282 However you refer
to them, they are public organizations that specifically care for chil-
dren who either did not have parents or had parents who were una-
ble to take care of them. This Note argues, however, that group
homes may help care for children who cannot return to their par-
ents within twenty-two months, but might be able to at some point
in the future.
Admittedly, congregate care is an unrealistic option for many
children. One of the main arguments against it is cost. In order to
be well run, these homes require significant funding. Costs per
child vary broadly from $20,000283 to $36,000284 to $70,000.285
When the homes are more homelike, and less institutional, these
costs increase even more. One of the reasons that orphanages fell
out of favor was that they were "institutional." The larger the asy-
lum, the more likely it was that children's days would be highly
routine.286 This regimentation was "far from the 'homelike'
ideal, '287 and the asylums were thus criticized for raising "institu-
tional" children who "lacked individuality. '288
280. Charles Dickens's novel tells the story of an English orphan who begins life in
a poorhouse.
281. Harold Gray's 1930s cartoon strip was later adapted into a popular musical
about a plucky red haired orphan adopted by millionaire Daddy Warbucks.
282. Cohen, supra note 235.
283. Carolyn Barta, Bringing Orphanages up to Date, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
June 21, 1998, at A13.
284. Elizabeth Shogren & Elizabeth Mehren, Close Look Suggests Role of Orphan-
age a Complex One, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1994, at Al.
285. Wornie Reed, Will Orphanages Work For Neglected Children?: Focus Re-
sources on Parents, Neighborhoods, Schools, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb.
25, 1999, at 9B.
286. Hacsi, supra note 211, at 148.
[The children] usually ate a meager diet, and in larger asylums wore
uniforms that decreased their sense of individuality and marked them as
'asylum children' to outsiders. Discipline remained an important part of
most asylum managers' thinking well into the twentieth century and was at
times harsh and brutal.
Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 159; see also id. at 37.
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With a smaller ratio of children to caretakers this problem would
be diminished. This problem also can be addressed by shifting
from dormitory-styled bedrooms and cafeterias to smaller units
where smaller groups of children are matched with house parents
who live round-the-clock with the same group of children. 28 9 Like-
wise, the orphanages of the past usually ran their own schools.29 °
This further isolated the children living within them, leading to stig-
matization. However, this was a product of the time in which they
existed. There is no reason why many children could not attend
ordinary public schools that would increase their interaction with
other children and the general community.29'
One of the benefits of group homes is that they offer stability.
As discussed earlier, many children in foster care drift from place-
ment to placement.292 This occurs for many reasons, but one of
them is to decrease the chance of substantial attachments develop-
ing between the foster child and his foster parents. However, this
leads to the very "drift" that ASFA seeks to prevent. Properly run
group homes would help prevent this problem. Children would
have a stable caring environment while not being torn between two
sets of parents. After all, we think of a good foster situation as one
that most closely resembles a biological family. Yet this sort of sit-
uation makes it difficult for a child who will not be adopted by that
family, eventually to be moved. By using properly equipped and
well-staffed group homes, a child's emotional needs could be met
without attachments being made to a second family with whom the
child will not stay. Group homes also should be easier to supervise
than foster homes, thus helping to curtail abuse and neglect of chil-
dren. Further, the constant presence of other children in a group
[Individuality is destroyed in an institution of that kind with a thousand
children, and how? The child is reared by the bell. The bell rings in the
morning to rise, the bell rings to dress, the bell rings for prayers . . . The
consequence is that the child is reared to do only something in the world that
it has its attention called to.
Id. at 37 (citing a speaker at the National Conference of Jewish Charities in 1904).
Charles Loring Brace, the founder of the Children's Aid Society went so far as to
declare orphan asylums un-American because they raised "a species of character
which is monastic-indolent, unused to struggle; subordinate indeed, but with little
independence and manly vigor." MATTHEW A. CRENSON, BUILDING THE INVISIBLE
ORPHANAGE 94 (1998) (citation omitted).
289. See Shrogen & Mehren, supra note 284.
290. HACSI, supra note 211, at 57.
291. By the twentieth century, more orphanages were like this. See discussion ac-
companying note 307.
292. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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home decreases isolation and lessens the potential for abuse to go
unnoticed.
Today, as was the case historically,293 most of the children in fos-
ter care are not orphans.2 94 The historic term "orphan asylum" was
largely a misnomer since most of the children living in these state
run homes were not "orphans." '295 At most, many were "half-or-
phans," children who had one living parent.296 Furthermore, as
general mortality rates fell, so did the number of "full orphans. 297
By the end of the nineteenth century, "reunification was usually a
real possibility" for many children living in orphanages,2 98 and by
the start of the twentieth century, the vast majority of children who
left orphanages returned to their families.299 Orphanages, like the
foster care system of today, often were used as a temporary solu-
tion to aid parents through difficult circumstances.
Traditionally, three different kinds of orphanages existed; each
type expressed different views with respect to the role of parents
and reunification. "Isolating orphanages" limited children's con-
tact with the outside world and their parents,3 °° with the intention
of separating children from their families and their religious and
ethnic heritages. 3 1 These asylums often were the legal guardians
of their wards and "explicitly sought to break the bonds between
parent and child. '30 2 "Protective orphanages" tried to protect the
children by controlling both their secular and their religious educa-
tion.30 3 However, this training usually would mirror the child's
own background.30 4 In these cases, managers were generally "will-
ing, and sometimes happy ' 30 5 to return children to the care of their
parents.30 6 The third kind of orphanage, "integrative asylums," did
293. HACSI, supra note 211, at 1.
294. The main reasons that children enter foster care are abuse, neglect and pov-
erty. Death of a parent is not a main cause. See Gendell, supra note 256, at 26.
295. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 877 (1991). "Orphan" is defined as
"a child whose parents are dead." Id.
296. HACS1, supra note 211, at 1. Today these children are often referred to as
"social orphans." Shrogen & Mehren, supra note 289.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 2.
299. Id. at 106.
300. Id. at 56.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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not exist until the final decades of the nineteenth century.3 °7 In
these asylums, children attended local schools and had regular con-
tact with their families.3 °8 Asylum managers struggled with
whether to seek legal guardianship over the children.30 9 Managers
who hoped to reunify families often feared taking away a parent's
legal rights would "damage the emotional bonds between parent
and child, thereby reducing the likelihood that children and par-
ents would reunite. 31 ° However, by obtaining guardianship, man-
agers could maintain the right not to surrender a child to parents
whom they deemed unfit. Likewise, visitation rights also varied
with the orphanage and the asylum manager. If a parent had le-
gally abandoned her parental rights, she usually would have no vis-
iting rights at all.31' Most asylums, however, allow visits twice per
week.3 12 By the twentieth century, more asylums had extended vis-
itation periods, 313 and the managers encouraged children and par-
ents to spend as much time together as possible. 314 These more
liberalized visiting hours were an effort to encourage the "reestab-
lishment of the parental home. '315
The integrative asylum is a possibility for children who will not
be adopted but for whom termination may be unnecessary.
Though certainly not perfect, these group homes could minimize
the conflict children feel when torn between their natural parents
whom they remember, and the foster parents with whom they live.
Furthermore, group homes would be able to foster a sense of be-
longing. A foster child is likely to live in a house, where, even if he
is cared for, he feels different because he is the only foster child he
knows. In a group setting where a child would be surrounded by
similarly situated children, this is less likely to happen. Also, with
foster care, there is a possibility that the placement will not succeed
or that the family will not be able to keep the child. For example,
Chris had been in several placements before he was placed with
307. Id. at 57. The author points out that the institutions that integrative asylums
relied on such as public school systems, sports leagues, and the Girl and Boy Scouts,
did not really exist yet. Id.
308. Id.
309. See id. at 126.
310. Id. at 127.
311. Id. at 128.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 129. These varied from the allowing of "an 'elaborate system of visiting'
•.. when the children returned to their parents for brief stays to having visiting hours
almost every day of the week." Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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Hill and Luebbert. Different placements may mean a child lacks
the stable environment he needs, and he may internalize a feeling
of not being wanted. Group homes would protect against this be-
cause a child would have a place where he could stay permanently.
One of the concerns with orphanages is that a child should not live
in one permanently because "it could close off the possibility of a
child's ever living with a family. ' 316 Perhaps this is true, but group
homes do not have to be a permanent solution. Orphanages could
function as a sort of halfway house for children in the midst of
parental terminations, or for those in the process of returning
home.
ASFA's federal provision assumes that parents' rights will be in-
voluntarily terminated.317 Although the federal mandates do not
specifically address voluntary relinquishment, they do not preclude
such considerations.318 In fact, concurrent planning offers the ben-
efit of providing parents with an opportunity to consider options
for their children. 319 Research suggests that involuntary termina-
tion may be detrimental to children,32° and one study found that
"[t]he adversary nature of the [involuntary] proceedings and their
length left the child[ren] in a limbo of anxiety and heightened loy-
alty conflicts in relation to the parents, grief about losing them, and
hostility toward the agency seeking the termination. '32' The em-
phasis on termination also may foreclose opportunities for parents
to consider arrangements such as open adoptions that would allow
some sort of ongoing relationship with their children.3 22
Furthermore, a parent is likely to feel threatened when faced
with the possibility that her child will be removed permanently
from her care. A mother may feel that her role was usurped if
another family is raising her children. This problem can be exacer-
bated if the foster family is better off economically and, therefore,
316. Katharine Q. Seelye, Orphanage Revival Gains Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
1997, at A8.
317. Freundlich, supra note 159, at 105-06.
318. See Freundlich, supra note 159, at 107. But see Katherine C. Pearson, Cooper-
ate or We'll Take Your Child: The Parent's Fictional Voluntary Separation Decision and
a Proposal for Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 835, 836 (1998). The author submits that
"voluntary" terminations are often coercive and misleading so as to pressure parents
to make immediate decisions. Id.
319. Id.
320. Robert Borgman, Antecedents and Consequences of Parental Rights Termina-
tion of Abused and Neglected Children, 60 CHILD WELFARE 391, 402-03 (1991).
321. Id.
322. Jeanne Etter, Levels of Cooperation and Satisfaction in 56 Open Adoptions, 72
CHILD WELFARE 257 (1993).
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better able to provide for the child. By utilizing the resources a
group home can provide, a natural parent who wants to stay in-
volved can do so in a less threatening way.
CONCLUSION
The government (both state and federal) cannot wait indefinitely
for parents to be able and ready to care for their children. This is
why ASFA's parental rights termination provision requires that
parents rehabilitate themselves quickly or have their parental
rights terminated. Despite this goal, parental termination is only
beneficial for children who later will be adopted. The emphasis on
a strict time line is not the answer to America's foster care
problem.
By placing a premium on the end results of adoption or termina-
tion, the states are ignoring the most difficult part of the problem.
New York stresses the preeminence of reunification, while Illinois
stresses adoption. These distinct approaches have led both to enact
responsive legislation and follow ASFA differently. Because New
York puts a premium on reunification, it relies more heavily on the
three statutory exceptions. Because Illinois emphasizes adoption,
it makes termination easier by adding the new unfitness standard.
Successful adoptions are happy endings. So are family reunifica-
tions. A stay in foster care is rarely as positive. The reason that
ASFA was enacted in the first place was to speed up this flawed
and difficult process. This Note suggests group homes as one per-
manent care solution for children who can neither return home nor
be adopted.
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